

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 EURE-00 SAM-01 ACDA-19 CIAE-00

PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01

PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5679

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3991

AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USMISSION GENEVA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 2639

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: COUNCIL GUIDANCE TO AD HOC GROUP ON LINKAGE BETWEEN
FIRST AND SECOND PHASES

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

1. COUNCIL ON MAY 14 REACHED AD REFERENDUM AGREEMENT ON GUIDANCE
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(FULL TEXT BELOW) TO ALLIED NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA ON THE FOLLOWING
ASSURANCES TO THE EAST WITH RESPECT TO PARTICIPATION BY NON-U.S.
NATO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN MBFR: A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME BETWEEN
PHASES, A NON-INCREASE OF FORCES COMMITMENT, AND A PROVISION FOR

REVIEW OF FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT AFTER FIVE YEARS. NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF PLANS TO TRANSMIT TEXT OFFICIALLY TO SECRETARY GENERAL'S REP IN AD HOC GROUP THIS AFTERNOON, WITH NOTE INDICATING THAT IF NO DELEGATION IN BRUSSELS OBJECTS TO GUIDANCE BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS TODAY, AD HOC GROUP IS AUTHORIZED TO DRAW UPON IT.

2. COUNCIL EXPECTS TO RETURN LATER THIS MONTH (I.E. WHEN UK AND CANADA HAVE POSITIONS) TO GUIDANCE ON ASSURANCES REGARDING COMMITMENT BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ENGAGED IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS. SEPTTEL TO WASHINGTON AND VIENNA CONTAINS DETAILED REPORT ON NAC DISCUSSION.

3. FULL TEXT OF COUNCIL GUIDANCE FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT

THE LINK BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASES
OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS (1)

I. INTRODUCTION

(A) BASIC CONCEPTS

(I) THE CONCEPT OF A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS IS CONTAINED IN C-M(73)83(FINAL), PARAGRAPH 34, WHICH STATES IN PART:

"THE ALLIES WILL NEGOTIATE FOR INCLUSION IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT OF LANGUAGE PROVIDING FOR A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR AGREEMENT TO THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON MANPOWER CEILING FOR NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA ... THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK FURTHER REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE SECOND PHASE ... ALTHOUGH ALLIED DECISIONS ON THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR FURTHER EXAMINATION AND REFLECTION
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WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, THIS SECOND PHASE SHOULD ON THE WESTERN SIDE FOCUS ON REDUCTIONS OF NON-US NATO FORCES ..."

(II) THE CONCEPT OF A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME IS SET OUT IN AGV(74)3, OF 24TH JANUARY, 1974, PARAGRAPH 5, WHICH SAYS IN PART:

"THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES ... COULD STATE THEIR VIEW THAT SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS COULD START 'WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME' AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE ONE AGREEMENT BASED ON ALLIED PROPOSALS,

INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING
CONCEPT."

THE AD HOC GROUP, IN ITS 5TH APRIL REPORT TO THE
COUNCIL, STATED THAT ALLIED NEGOTIATORS HAVE TOLD
THE EAST THAT THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS COULD
TAKE PLACE WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME FROM
THE "ENTRY INTO FORCE" OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST
PHASE AGREEMENT.

(B) CENTRAL OBJECTIVES

IN THE NEXT MBFR NEGOTIATING SESSION, THE ALLIED
NEGOTIATORS SHOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE OBJECTIVE OF
GETTING THE EAST TO ACCEPT NEGOTIATION IN A FIRST PHASE
OF ONLY US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND TO DEFER REDUCTIONS OF

OTHER NATO FORCES TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. AT
THE SAME TIME, THE NEGOTIATORS SHOULD CONTINUE TO
EMPHASIZE THE COMMON CEILING AS THE BASIS FOR THE OVERALL
ALLIED APPROACH AND A CENTRAL OBJECTIVE.

BEGIN FOOTNOTE:

(1) THE TERM "PHASE", AS USED HERE, HAS THE AGREED C-M(73)83
MEANING OF "A MAJOR NEGOTIATING PERIOD RESULTING IN AN MBFR
AGREEMENT (E.G., THE FIRST PHASE WITH REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET
AND US FORCES)". END FOOTNOTE.

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TO ACHIEVE THE FOREGOING OBJECTIVES, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS
ARE AUTHORIZED TO PROCEED AS OUTLINED IN SECTIONS II-V
BELOW, IF AND AS JUSTIFIED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
TACTICAL NEGOTIATING SITUATION; ALL POINTS WOULD BE
CONTINGENT ON REACHING A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE
AGREEMENT, INCLUDING COMMITMENT TO THE COMMON
CEILING CONCEPT.

IN ORALLY INDICATING TO THE EAST THEIR WILLINGNESS
TO TAKE THESE STEPS, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD USE
GENERAL LANGUAGE IN DRAWING ON THE INSTRUCTIONS BELOW.
WHILE KEEPING IN MIND CONDITIONS SET FORTH IN THIS
INSTRUCTION, AND AVOIDING STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD
CONFLICT WITH THEM, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD POSTPONE
SPECIFIC FORMULATIONS UNTIL ACTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS JUSTIFIES SUCH ACTION. THE AD HOC GROUP
SHOULD DETERMINE THE TACTICS AND SEQUENCE OF
PRESENTATION TO THE EAST OF THE ITEMS BELOW.

II. THE FIXING OF THE PERIOD OF TIME BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES

WITH RESPECT TO PREVIOUS ALLIED INDICATIONS THAT THE

FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD CONTAIN A PROVISION THAT SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN WITHIN AN AGREED FIXED PERIOD OF TIME AFTER THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD TELL THE EAST THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE DURATION OF THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE CONCLUSION OF FIRST PHASE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE BEGINNING OF SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS. DEPENDING UPON THE PROGRESS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, THE ALLIES WOULD IN DUE COURSE BE PREPARED TO INDICATE THAT THEY WOULD EXPECT SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS TO BEGIN AS SOON AFTER FIRST PHASE SIGNATURE AS IS PRACTICABLE, WHICH NEED NOT BE LATER THAN IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRST PHASE WITHDRAWALS. IF THE NEGOTIATORS FIND IT NECESSARY IN THE LIGHT OF THE TACTICAL NEGOTIATING SITUATION, THEY COULD INDICATE THAT THEIR PRELIMINARY ASSUMPTION IS THAT THE PERIOD REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THESE WITHDRAWALS NEED NOT BE LONGER THAN 18 MONTHS.

FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE AD HOC GROUP ONLY, PERFORMANCE ON THE COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN IN THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD BE A FACTOR IN DETERMINING THE CONDUCT OF THE SECOND
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PHASE NEGOTIATIONS AND IN INFLUENCING THEIR SATISFACTORY OUTCOME.

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EB-11 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 USIE-00 AECE-00 DRC-01

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5680

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3992

AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USMISSION GENEVA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

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III. NON-INCREASE OF FORCES COMMITMENT

TO MEET EASTERN CONCERNS THAT WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MIGHT INCREASE THEIR FORCES BETWEEN PHASES TO COMPENSATE FOR US WITHDRAWALS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF WESTERN FIRST PHASE PROPOSALS, WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS A NON-INCREASE OF FORCES COMMITMENT BINDING THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND APPLYING BETWEEN A FIRST PHASE AND A SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT. THE MATERIAL IN PARENTHESES BELOW IS FOR THE INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE OF THE AD HOC GROUP ONLY, AND
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NOT FOR USE WITH THE OTHER SIDE AT THIS TIME.

SPECIFICS OF THE COMMITMENT

(A) THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON EACH SIDE WOULD AGREE THAT THE OVERALL AGGREGATE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER (PERMANENTLY STATIONED) IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT BE INCREASED BEYOND THE LEVEL EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE REDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES ESTABLISHED IN THAT AGREEMENT. (THE COMMITMENT SHOULD BE FORMULATED IN SUCH A WAY THAT NO NATIONAL OR COLLECTIVE SUB-CEILINGS ON NON-US NATO FORCES ARE CREATED. IT IS NOT INTENDED TO INCLUDE EQUIPMENT OF ANY KIND IN THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT. THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD OF COURSE PROHIBIT THE SOVIETS FROM TRANSFERRING THEIR TANKS TO POLAD, CZECHOSLOVAKIA OR THE GDR, SINCE THE ALLIED POSITION CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF THE TANKS TO THE SOVIET HOMELAND. THE POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF SOVIET TANKS TO WARSAW PACT ALLIES OUTSIDE THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE PROHIBITED, E.G. IN NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS.)

(B) THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD COME INTO FORCE ONLY UPON CONCLUSION OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, (IN ACCORDANCE WITH C-M(73)83(FINAL)) INCLUDING, IN PARTICULAR, THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT.

(C) THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BE CLEARLY PRESENTED TO THE OTHER SIDE AS A MEANS OF LINKING THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASES. (THE NEGOTIATORS SHOULD DO NOTHING TO PRE-JUDGE THE FORM OF THE COMMITMENT. THE ALLIANCE

WOULD STUDY WHICH FORM SUCH A COMMITMENT WOULD TAKE, E.G. A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION IN THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT ITSELF, A JOINT EAST-WEST DECLARATION MADE ON OR SHORTLY AFTER THE DATE OF THE SIGNING OF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, SEPARATE OR COLLECTIVE DECLARATIONS OF INTENT BY BOTH SIDES MADE ON OR SHORTLY AFTER THE DATE OF THE SIGNING OF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, OR
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THE RECORD OF A PLEANRY MEETING SHOWING THAT A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE WESTERN SIDE AND ONE FROM THE EASTERN SIDE HAD MADE SIMILAR STATEMENTS AGREEING TO THE COMMITMENT.)

(D) THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BECOME INVALID IF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED OR IF THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS WERE BROKEN OFF. A SATISFACTORY SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT, WHEN CONCLUDED, WOULD AUTOMATICALLY SUPERSEDE THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT.

(E) IN ANY EVENT, THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BE LIMITED IN DURATION, THE EXACT PERIOD TO BE FIXED, SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS (REFERENCE: SECTION II). (THE MAXIMUM PERIOD COULD BE EXTENDED BY MUTUAL CONSENT OF THE TWO SIDES. SUCH MUTUAL CONSENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS HAD MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS AND SHOWED REASONABLE PROMISE OF A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION.)

(F) THE COMMITMENT SHOULD CONTAIN EXCEPTIONS TO ALLOW FOR NORMAL EXERCISES AND ROTATIONS(1). (THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT SHOULD BE SO FORMULATED THAT IT WOULD IN NO WAY RESTRICT QUALITATIVE FORCE IMPROVEMENTS ON THE WESTERN SIDE OR OTHERWISE HINDER DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITHIN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.)

(G) (THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE NON-INCREASE OFFER TO THE EASTERN SIDE IS MADE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSSIBLE INCLUSION OF HUNGARY IN MBFR AGREEMENTS. FURTHERMORE, IN NEGOTIATING A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT, ACCOUNT SHOULD BE TAKEN OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE LEVEL OF SOVIET FORCES IN HUNGARY CAN BE COVERED BY A NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE IN THE FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT.)

BEGIN FOOTNOTE

(1) (THE EXACT NATURE OF THESE EXCEPTIONS WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF TECHNICAL STUDY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.)

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END FOOTNOTE.

IV. ASSURANCES TO OTHER SIDE REGARDING SECOND PHASE

(DRAFT GUIDANCE TO BE ELABORATED FOR COUNCIL CONSIDERATION
BEFORE THE END OF MAY.)

V. REVIEW PROCEDURE (1)

IF AND WHEN NEEDED, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS COULD AGREE THAT
THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT CONTAIN A PROVISION STIPULATING THAT, FIVE
YEARS FOLLOWING THE SIGNATURE OF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, THE TWO
SIDES WOULD CONSIDER THE EXTENT TO WHICH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT
HAD BEEN SATISFACTORY AND EXAMINE THE RESULTS OF SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS.
THE PARTICIPANTS WOULD THEN BE IN A POSITION TO DRAW THE
APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS.

BEGIN FOOTNOTE:

(1) SOME DELEGATIONS ASKED THAT THIS SECTION BE DELETED. THEY
FELT THAT WITHDRAWAL/REVIEW PROVISIONS SHOULD BE ELABORATED
NOT IN THE LINK CONTEXT BUT IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUIREMENT
IN PARAGRAPH 37 OF C-M(73)83(FINAL) FOR A GENERAL WITHDRAWAL
CLAUSE IN THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT.)

END FOOTNOTE

END TEXT
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To: STATE
SECDEF INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
VIENNA
MOSCOW
BUCHAREST
BUDAPEST
PRAGUE

SOFIA
WARSAW
GENEVA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

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